Although some European Member States have made important achievements with respect to anti-stalking legislation, significant deficiencies still exist. To begin with, the majority of Member States have not criminalized stalking at all, and the ones that have differ greatly as to certain constitutive elements of the crime of stalking. Stalking provisions vary, for instance, with respect to penalties imposed, the inclusion of a list of stalking tactics, requirements for prosecution, requisite intent on the part of the perpetrator, etcetera. Another aspect in which Member States diverge is the manner in which protection of (stalking) victims is constructed.
The question is: Should and could attempts be made to (further) harmonize the anti-stalking legislation in the EU Member States and if so, how?
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to reflect on the current state of affairs in stalking legislation in the EU Member States (section 2): Which Member States have enacted antistalking legislation and which Member States have not, how do legal definitions of stalking compare to each other, what similarities and differences can be discerned in the approach of Member States towards stalking, and what approach should be preferred if we take an integrated human rights based approach as starting point? Against that backdrop, not only the criminalization of stalking is taken into account, but attention is also paid to protective measures for victims, notably the possibility of obtaining civil and criminal restraining orders (section 3). For criminalization alone is not enough. Victims should also be able to apply for efficient protection from their assailant. The second aim is to see whether on a European level harmonization of national anti-stalking legislation might be feasible. To this end, the way in which the United States have tried to harmonize state legislation and the current initiatives on a European level are described first (section 4). After that, the most suitable legal basis for the EU to base its further involvement on is discussed (also section 4), followed by an overall conclusion (section 5).
II. The criminalization of stalking in the European Member States
This section takes stock of the ways in which European countries have criminalized the conduct. In 2007, there was a first attempt at mapping the different approaches towards stalking in Europe. In the context of the Daphne Research Program, the Modena Group on Stalking collected information and analyzed the legal situation in the European Member States. 10 In a subsequent article, De Fazio updated the findings of the Modena Project. 11 The most recent study that looked into stalking legislation in the European Member States was the European Commission's feasibility study. 12 Based on a detailed analysis of the (legislative) approach in the 27 EU Member States to inter alia violence against women, including stalking, a comparative analysis was made of how a range of legislative and support measures 10 Modena Group on Stalking, Protecting women from the new crime of stalking; A comparison of legislative approaches within the European Union, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia 2007. 11 L. de Fazio, The legal situation on stalking among the European member states, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (15) 2009, pp. 229-242. 12 European Commission (fn. 8).
had been taken in the EU. The following section partly builds on the results of these three previous studies, but is mainly based on an in-depth analysis of the legal provisions on stalking (see Appendix).
In this section we will not discuss and compare all the constituent elements of the different legal stalking definitions that are used in the EU Member States. The definitions diverge widely. To analyze every one of them on a detailed level is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, we will focus on what seem to be the most essential and overarching similarities and differences between the various legal stalking definitions.
Legislation of Member States on stalking
The 27 EU Member States are virtually split in half when it comes to whether or not stalking has been criminalized. A total of thirteen countries (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, and the UK) have criminalized, and a slight majority of fourteen European Member States have not criminalized stalking at all. These latter states often contest the necessity of having specific legislation in place. They argue that the existing laws are perfectly able to deal with instances of stalking already and that there is no need for a separate criminalization of the conduct. In their opinion, the combination between existing criminal law and (civil) protection order provisions should suffice to effectively counter stalking behaviour. Another reason why some Member States have not criminalized stalking is that the phenomenon is not considered a social problem. 13 In those countries, the topic of stalking has not (yet) given rise to much public and academic debate, thereby failing to provide the necessary impetus for legislative change. The lack of any sustained public debate or activism regarding stalking was found to be one of the main reasons why some countries lack specific legislation on stalking. 14 Some Member States that have not adopted specific criminal anti-stalking legislation encounter problems in bringing the problem under the attention of the police. In the feasibility study two problems in relation to the lack of specific anti-stalking legislation could be identified: 15
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The generic criminal and civil law provisions are not efficient in combating stalking.
The lack of a specific provision, for example, causes the police to wait for escalations and remain inactive in the early stages of the harassment, even if other provisions are applicable.
The generic provisions do not cover stalking in its entirety, they do not cover certain forms of stalking, and/or they do not cover certain victims of stalking.
These problems have inspired the other Member States to criminalize stalking. Characteristic of the European situation is that there is a lot of variance in the way these Member States have defined the conduct and in the way prosecution is set up. However, before the legislative definitions are compared, a caveat needs to be made. The following analysis is based on a close reading of the anti-stalking provisions. It could be that in national practice, case law or parliamentary debates have introduced additional criteria. It was beyond the scope of this paper to structurally check for. Another problem could be that, despite due care, mistakes might have been made in translating and interpreting the legal provisions. Taking these limitations into account, if we look at the legal definitions of stalking (see Appendix), several commonalities can be discerned: 1) With the exception of Belgium, all legal definitions require a 'course of conduct' or 'repetitive behaviour', not single incidents. However, although according to Belgian law one incident can suffice, the Belgian Supreme court has ruled that the behaviour needs to be repetitive in order to qualify as stalking, making the difference in definition virtually theoretical.
2) All the legal definitions use open or broad concepts, such as 'harassment' or 'pursuit', which require further interpretation by the courts. This broad terminology is used in an attempt to capture the variety of stalking tactics. More narrowly defined provisions exclude certain stalking behaviours and enable stalkers to easily circumvent prosecution.
However necessary, notably to fully capture the wide range of stalking behaviours and the 'course of conduct'-element, it is exactly this broadness or all-inclusiveness which is sometimes criticized. In the Netherlands, for example, the broad definition of stalking and its possible infringement on the principle of legal certainty was heavily debated in parliament before the new law was introduced. 16 Broad concepts may evoke uncertainty of meaning and mayparadoxicallyeven lead to very strict interpretations in case law. 17 Some broad statutory elements such as 'regular and persistent harassment' or 'with the intention to intimidate', may not be inclusive enough, at least not in the minds of law enforcement officials. They may interpret these terms very strictly, only allowing the most serious cases to be prosecuted.
Next to the similarities, there are also points on which the Member States diverge:
a) A (new) provision in the Criminal Code or an Act
The Member States that have criminalized stalking can be subdivided into three categories: 1) the Member States that introduced a new provision in their Criminal Code, 2) the Member States that amended an existing criminal provision, and 3) the Member States that introduced a dedicated Act against stalking. Usually, these legislative differences are inspired by longstanding legal traditions. As appears from the Appendix, most Member States have opted for the inclusion of a new provision in their Criminal Codes. Only the UK and Ireland have created a specific Act which includes stalking behaviour. Denmark, which had already criminalized stalking-like behaviour back in 1933, has made several changes to the existing provision, mainly increasing the maximum penalty.
The advantage of a dedicated Act over a new provision in the Criminal Code is that these Acts often bring along some form of framework regulation. This means that not only the criminalization of stalking is regulated, but also that other important aspects, such as the protection of the victim or the implementation of the law in practice, have been addressed in one and the same document. Of course, in other countries these other aspects may have been sufficiently regulated as well, albeit in a separate regulation. 18 Both options bring different advantages and disadvantages, depending also on the wider national legislative context and culture. 16 See, for instance, the remarks of Member of Parliament Halsema (Parliamentary Documents, Handelingen II 1998/99, no. 97, p. 5668) . 17 European Commission (fn. 8), p. 67.
b) The maximum and minimum penalty
Where the range of sanctions is concerned, there is a lot of variance amongst the Member States. The statutory maximum penalty ranges from three months (Malta) to ten years imprisonment (Poland). In itself it is not surprising that the maximum penalties differ, since national legal systems tend to differ with regard to the maximum penalty for all sorts of crimes, regardless of the specifics of stalking. In order to establish a suitable maximum penalty for stalking, the entire national legal system has to be taken into account: What are the maximum penalties for other offences and where does stalking fit in? To recommend across the board that stalking should always carry a particular maximum penalty is therefore difficult and would have the undesirable consequence that in certain jurisdictions it would carry a higher penalty than offences that are generally considered equally or more worthy of punishment. However, what is relevant from a transnational EU perspective is that a rather low maximum penalty can cause problems when the extradition of a suspected or convicted stalker is requested. 19 Usually, extradition schemes require what is called an 'aggravated double criminality'. 20 The offence not only has to be criminalized in the requested and the requesting country, but the maximum penalty in both countries needs to be at least one year imprisonment. Malta and Member States that currently consider drafting anti-stalking legislation are for that reason advised to create a provision that carries a maximum penalty of at least one year imprisonment.
c) Negative consequences for the victim
Member States' legal definitions of stalking reflect different positions on whether evidence regarding the negative consequences of the stalking for the victim needs to be proven in court.
In Germany, for instance, it needs to be proven that the behaviour has 'seriously infringed on the lifestyle of the victim'. Similar requirements can be found in Ireland ('seriously interferes with the other's peace and privacy or causes alarm, distress or harm') and Poland ('raises in him a reasonable fear or significantly violates his privacy'). In Malta, the UK and Hungary, the situation is somewhat different. There stalking is comprised of two primary offences, both involving a course of conduct. In each of these countries, the first offence does not have negative consequences as a qualifying element for the crime of stalking. Only the second offencecarrying a higher maximum penaltyrequires proof of the negative impact on the victim's life. The Dutch, Czech, Italian, Belgian, Austrian, Luxemburg, and Danish antistalking provisions do not require the victim to have experienced fear, distress or any other negative consequence as a result of the stalking. The advantage of this latter approach is that it alleviates the burden of proof for the (public) prosecutor: he or she does not have to collect evidence on the impact of the stalking on the victim. Especially where the mental effects are concerned, this requirement poses certain challenges. What is, for example, an appropriate level of fear and how can this be assessed adequately? And how can be prevented that an exceptionally equable victim is treated differently from a victim of a more nervous nature? An important factor in this respect is the fact that in the United Statesthe pioneer when it comes to the criminalization of stalkingmore and more states are adopting anti-stalking legislation in which the victim is no longer supposed to actually have suffered a certain level of feare.g., fear of bodily injury or deathbut where it suffices if a reasonable person would suffer emotional stress, because of the harassment. 21 A number of US courts have held that this emotional distress no longer needs to be proven by independent expert testimony. Other legislators thought it more expedient to provide the legal authorities with some guidance by spelling out certain behaviours that are typical of the crime of stalking. In those countries, the way in which the crime is clarified varies from a very basic description 23 to a systematic enumeration of all the possible behaviours that could amount to stalking. 24 In principle, providing something of a handle for the criminal justice actors to rely on it can be very useful to prevent or diminish problems with the lex certa principlethe principle that prescribes that the scope and definition of a criminal offence has to be sufficiently predictable for citizens so that they are informed about the potential consequences and can adjust their behaviour. However, legislators should be cautious not to include limitative or exhaustive lists of stalking tactics since stalkers are notorious for their creativity and they may be able to find ways to easily get round the criminal offence once a limitative list of acts is incorporated in the legal provision. 25 revealed that the volunteers had interpreted the Dutch equivalent of stalking (belaging) as a mild and non-punitive form of harassment (such as having a snowball thrown at you). 29
However, the indiscriminate adoption of the English word 'stalking' may generate disadvantages that are the exact opposite from the ones mentioned above. Stalking could, for instance, be seen as something that is more serious and less inclusive than harassment. Certain deviant behaviour may then fall under the radar of the general public or the police as well.
Also it seems not the preferred choice of most countries to adopt foreign words or expressions in its national legislation. Regardless of the terms chosen, possible ambiguities as to its meaning can be addressed effectively by having the introduction of new anti-stalking legislation accompanied by a publicity campaign and a solid training of law practitioners.
f) Prosecution on the basis of a complaint of the victim or prosecution ex officio
Another difference between the Member States' legislation is the manner in which the crime of stalking can be prosecuted. In some Member States the complaint of the victim is a statutory requirement for prosecution. This means that if there is no official complaint or if the complaint has been withdrawn within the statutory limits, the public prosecutor is barred from prosecution. Belgium, Luxemburg, Hungary, Poland and the Netherlands have adopted this approach. In Germany, stalking is also a complaint offence, but an exception has been made for cases in which the public prosecutor considers that there is a special public interest in prosecution. In the context of post-separation stalking, for example, the prosecutor can decide that the victim cannot be expected to ask for prosecution. In addition, if the stalker 'places the victim or a person close to the victim in danger of death or serious injury', the offence has to be prosecuted ex officio as well. In Italy, there is also a combination of prosecution on the complaint of the victim and prosecution ex officio, and in Denmark they have a system which can be considered a derivative of the complaint procedure. Danish victims first have to request the police to issue a formal warning to the (alleged) offender and only after the offender has acted in violation of this warning, he or she can be prosecuted. perpetrated by means of (tele)communication and/or through third parties could only be prosecuted after a complaint of the victim. Nowadays, all forms of stalking can be prosecuted ex officio, even if this goes against the victim's wishes.
Each system has its pros and cons. The complaint requirement can form a barrier to prosecution. Some victims withdraw their complaints due to pressure from the suspect or out of fear of revenge, or the prosecution is hindered because of failure to comply with the formalities attached to the complaint procedure. In the Netherlands, for example, the public prosecutor was sometimes barred, because the case file did not contain an explicit complaint by the victim. 31 On the other hand, there may also be victims who welcome to have decisive influence on prosecution that a complaint procedure brings along. They want to stop the stalking but have, for instance, a genuine fear or lack of faith in the effectiveness to follow the criminal legal procedure through. 32 Another reason why they do not wish to lodge a complaint is that they do not want to stigmatize the stalker or they dread having to reveal private matters in court. These victims resort to the police in search for other solutions instead of a trial, such as police protection or an official warning to the stalker.
g) Intent of the stalker
A final aspect in which the Member States' legislation on stalking differs is the required level of intent or mens rea on the part of the perpetrator. Although the levels of intent vary per jurisdiction, the following degrees can roughly be distinguished:
Intentionally or purposely: the stalker has a clear foresight of the consequences of his/her actions, and desires those consequences to occur.
Knowingly: the stalker knows, or should know, that the results of his/her actions are reasonably certain to occur.
Recklessly: the stalker foresees that particular consequences may occur and proceeds with the given conduct, not caring whether those consequences actually occur or not. Another distinction that can have an impact on the burden of proof is the one between basic intent and specific intent. 35 A basic intent crime requires nothing more than that the crime is intentionally or recklessly committed. A specific intent crime requires (in addition to basic intent) that the offender intended certain negative consequences of his actions. Specific intent statutes may be more difficult to prosecute, given that the prosecution has to prove that the stalker intended the consequences of his actions. 36 Besides the additional burden to the public prosecutor, there is also the danger that it exempts a certain type of stalker from criminal prosecution. Erotomanics or love infatuated stalkers, for instance, generally claim they do not wish to harm the targets of their stalking behaviour, but wish to court them instead. 33 In the stalking definitions of the Czech Republic, Denmark and Germany no element of intent could be detected. Probably, criminal intent in these countries is regulated elsewhere (e.g., in a general clause). In Poland, only the stalking described in Article 190a (2) of in-depth comparative study. As of late, certain research projects have touched upon the issue in a preliminary fashion and have scratched the surface of the various protection regimes in the EU. 41 An additional problem is that sometimes the data contain irregularities and contradict one another.
III. The importance of protection
Despite these limitations, the available data at this point indicate that when it comes to criminal protection orders, practically each Member State has some form of protection in place, 42 but the criminal protection orders come in many shapes and forms and the level of protection provided by them varies accordingly. In some Member States, the criminal justice system, for example, does not provide protection before there is a final judgment (e.g., Luxemburg, Bulgaria, Czech Republic). In these countries only the criminal courts can only impose protection orders in cases that resulted in a conviction. In other countries only pre-trial protection orders can be issued which are valid until the final judgment (e.g., Latvia, Italy). Of course, having both pre-trial and post-trial orders available is to be preferred. 43 Another factor that can seriously hamper adequate victim protection is the restriction of criminal protection orders to a limited range of victims only. In Cyprus and possibly also Greece, for example, they are available to victims of domestic violence and/or human trafficking, but not to others.
Victims who are stalked by people other than their (former) partners cannot benefit from the orders.
For victims of stalking, one obstacle is probably even more problematic than all the aforementioned barriers to obtaining a criminal protection order and that is the fact that Access to civil protection orders is more widely available: a large majority of EU Member
States does provide access to civil injunction or civil restraining orders (except e.g., Romania, and Latvia). In comparison, American stalking victims seem better off: All US states allow individuals to seek civil protection when they are subjected to stalking by another person. 44
Another feature that puts stalking victims at a disadvantage is the fact that even in Member
States where civil protection orders are availableagainnot all stalking victims have access to them, for instance, because in some cases they are only available to victims of stalking by (ex-)partners.
IV. European developments toward harmonization
Notwithstanding the limitations, the information available does indicate that, when it comes to stalking legislation, there seems to be ample room for improvement. The following section focuses on European developments towards promoting and enhancing national anti-stalking legislation. We will first describe the US approach to see how US Congress has played an active role in trying to direct legislative efforts and reduce the differences between the different state based anti-stalking provisions. We will return to the European developments and briefly discuss whether and how a human rights based framework might be relevant to enhance developments towards harmonization.
Harmonization in the United States
In the United States, stalking legislation is in principle regulated on a state level. Concerned that the states would enact flawed and unenforceable statutes and realizing the possible multijurisdictional nature of stalking, the US Congress has however played an active role, and felt the need to harmonize state laws and procedures within its territory. 45 It did so with the help of different approaches.
In 1993, after most states had already enacted anti-stalking legislation, the National Institute of Justice developed a model stalking Code to provide States with a template that was expected to withstand the anticipated constitutional challenges. This code was accompanied by a series of regional training seminars on issues related to the implementation of the model Code. 46 As a result, many states amended their state statutes to bring them in line with the recommendations of the model Code. From this point of view, the model Code was a resounding success. Still there remain significant differences between the various state laws.
States' legislations differ, for example, with respect to the specific acts that are prohibited, in the requisite level of mens rea of the perpetrator, and in whether a threat is required. 47
These differences would not matter as long as the stalking remains within the jurisdiction of one state only. But given that there are cases that cross borders, state law needed to be respect crucial and the developments of national policy is to a certain extent inherent to the American federal system.
Current initiatives in Europe
As of lately, more and more initiatives have surfaced in order to place stalking firmly on the Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the intentional conduct of repeatedly engaging in threatening conduct directed at another person, causing her or him to fear for her or his safety, is criminalized.
The explanatory report to the Convention explains that the 'threatening behaviour may consist of repeatedly following another person, engaging in unwanted communication with another person or letting another person know that he or she is being observed', but other types of behaviour are also mentioned (e.g., vandalizing the property of another person, targeting a person's pet, setting up false identities or spreading untruthful information online). 54 So although the Convention itself does not contain a list of stalking tactics, the explanatory report does. Although the explanatory report is not binding law, some issues deserve critical examination. Judging by the wording of the explanatory report, this list is not exhaustive, so it does not seriously limit the ambit of the provision. What potentially could, however, limit the interpretative scope of this article is the requirement that 'any act of such threatening conduct needs to be carried out intentionally and with the intention of instilling in the victim a sense of fear'. In other words, the stalking provision is a 'specific intent' crime: In addition to intentionally committing prohibited acts, the stalker also intended the negative consequences of the actions. This not only places an extra evidentiary burden on the public prosecution service, but it could exempt the so-called love infatuated stalker from criminal prosecution. 
b) Developments in the European Union
Despite the limited competence which constrains the development of transnational EUlegislation on stalking, several political and legislative efforts reflect the growing concern for stalking victims within the EU. another Member State would have to start new proceedings as if the previous decision had never been adopted. The problem is that the EPO has a very limited applicabilityonly stalking victims who move to another Member State and who remain to be in danger can benefit from the EPOand it also does not change the fact that there are large discrepancies in the levels of protection offered in the various Member States. 61
Towards harmonization across Europe
As described in the previous paragraph, there have been various initiatives to induce states to adopt anti-stalking legislation or to otherwise improve the situation for stalking victims. These initiatives, although laudable, may not be sufficient for the following reasons: The EPO will only be applicable to a very limited number of cases without changing the current status quo in stalking or protection order legislation in the Member States.
The written declaration on stalking has lapsed and the ensuing resolution by the European Parliament does not really commit Member States to make significant changes to their legislation.
The Council of Europe Convention, which, by combining criminalization and protection in one binding instrument, is by far the most promising initiative but its Jointly identifying and defining objectives to be achieved (adopted by the Council)
Jointly establishing measuring instruments (statistics, indicators, guidelines); and
Benchmarking, i.e. comparing the Member States' performance and exchange of best practices (monitored by the Commission). 64 Applying the open method of coordination in the field of stalking would not only send out a strong message to Member States that the criminalization of stalking and the protection of (stalking) victims is of paramount importance, but it would also provide the Member States with a template on which they can base their national legislation. In this sense it could resemble the US Draft Code, albeit that even better implementation mechanisms are provided for by means of periodic monitoring and peer reviews.
V. Conclusion
The biggest omission in anti-stalking legislation in the EU is the fact that the majority of Member States have not criminalized the conduct. Specifically criminalizing stalking behaviour seems crucial, given that generic legal provisions are inefficient in combating stalking and do not cover stalking behaviour in its entirety. If those Member States would consider enacting anti-stalking legislation in the future, it is useful to learn from earlier experiences. The explorative comparison of stalking provisions presented here reveals, for instance, that using broad terminology is probably necessary, but that it may be in the interest of equal implementation in legal praxis to provide legal subjects with some guidance by means of including a (non exhaustive!) list of stalking tactics. Another factor to keep in mind is that a maximum penalty of less than one year may bring along extradition difficulties. More difficult is the choice between including negative consequences for the victim (fear) as a constitutive element of the stalking provision or not, between prosecution ex officio and a complaint offence, and between the level of mens rea on the part of the stalker. Here fundamental differences of opinion on the reasons for criminalizing stalking, on the legitimacy of prosecution in these cases, and on the criminal liability of the offender play a role. Some laws stand out for the great importance given to the right to privacy, whereas other countries, with their emphasis on anxiety of the victim, take the right to live without fear as a justification for criminalization. Privacy also plays an important role in the choice between prosecution on the complaint of the victim and prosecution ex officio, but then in the sense that victims should (or should not) have the right to guard their private affairs from public interference. Member States will have to form an opinion on these issues and draft their legislation accordingly.
The general picture that emerged from the comparison was that there is not only a huge variation in criminal anti-stalking legislation across the EU, but that victim protection in certain Member States leaves much to be desired as well. Both from a human rights and from a victim rights perspective, emphasizing the need to go beyond prosecution and offer preventive, supportive and protective provisions to victims, and in light of the growing body of international binding obligations to offer adequate victim protection, 65 this situation no longer seems tenable. Not only the criminalization of stalking, but the combination of criminalization with protection is crucial. A first thing then, is to have all Member States implement civil and criminal, pre-and post-trial protection orders in addition to dedicated anti-stalking legislation.
In the current political climateheavily influenced by the economic crisischances are small another person in order to cause a persistent anxiety or fear or a serious concern for his/her safety or for the Section 2: 'A person who pursues a course of conduct in breach of section 1 is guilty of an offence. A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both.' Section 4: 'A person whose course of conduct causes another to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against him is guilty of an offence if he knows or ought to know that this course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each of those occasions. For the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it will cause another to fear that violence will be used against him on any occasion if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct would cause the other so to fear on that occasion. A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both, or on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both.' Section 7:
'References to harassing a person include alarming the person of causing the person distress.'
